Over the next 7 days, almost 5000 flights were cancelled or disrupted and more than 882,000 passengers were impacted! At the heart of it, Indigo alleged, were a technical glitch, weather conditions and the so-called new Flight and Duty Time Limitations (FDTL) conditions issued by India’s aviation regulator, the Directorate General of Civil Aviations (DGCA).
Flying in India is different
The International Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO) signatory nations mandate FDTL to ensure pilot and crew safety. While India is an International Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO) signatory, it long followed outdated FDTL norms. Indian pilots have sought scientifically grounded, globally aligned FDTL rules and in 2019 approached the Delhi High Court, prompting regulatory action. In January 2024, the DGCA finally notified a new FDTL Civil Aviation Requirement (CAR), but airline opposition stalled its implementation. The DGCA sought time for airline readiness, first requesting 12 months, then six more in early 2025. Phase 1 in June 2025 went smoothly, but it was phase 2, which kicked in from 1 November 2025, that troubled a few airlines. However, all the airlines had spent the previous 23 months recruiting pilots and shoring up their workforce and systems, except Indigo.
Many critics argue that India’s FDTL are more relaxed than those in the UK or the US. While certain clauses are indeed more favourable, these comparisons ignore crucial context. Most UK and European airports, and several in the US, operate under night curfews, significantly reducing night flying. India has no such curfews. Pilots point out that, India is a continent. Without time zones, flights routinely span vast distances. A two-and-a-half-hour European flight can cross multiple countries, while in India, long domestic sectors replicate transcontinental fatigue patterns. Compounding this, nearly 90 per cent of India’s international flights depart at night to arrive in Europe or North America at daybreak, operating squarely within the Window of Circadian Low (WOCL).
What went wrong?
Unbeknownst to the public, IndiGo paused pilot recruitment in June 2025 and let go of 40 senior first officers in September. In January 2025, it had laid off another 80 first officers. Yet in investor calls in May and November, IndiGo’s leadership downplayed the impact of the revised FDTL, describing it as a low single-digit cost increase. The CFO acknowledged some incremental cost from phase 2 implementation in November 2025, but nothing ppeared alarming to management.
IndiGo appears to have fundamentally miscalculated or, as some allege, attempted to economically game the DGCA’s court-approved CAR. IndiGo insiders, speaking anonymously, claim the airline froze pilot recruitment, curtailed command upgrades, relied on buying out pilots’ earned leave at low rates and maintained the leanest pilot workforce in the industry. Internal simulations reportedly showed the winter schedule was barely manageable, yet the airline proceeded regardless.
Risky Bet on a Bigger Winter
The numbers are stark. IndiGo operated a seven-month summer schedule with 14,158 flights. For the shorter five-month winter peak, it submitted a schedule of 15,014 flights. an increase of nearly 900 flights with fewer pilots. This practice, known as slot blocking, is designed to prevent competitors from accessing airport slots and has long been a feature of IndiGo’s aggressive strategy. In this case, it proved unsustainable. By November, IndiGo had already cancelled 1200 flights. Yet no decisive regulatory intervention followed. When the system finally collapsed in early December, IndiGo sought and received temporary waivers from the court-approved FDTL CAR instead of being forced to cut its network to manageable levels.
The contrast with other airlines is telling. Air India, Akasa, and Air India Express complied with the same CAR but avoided disruption by recruiting pilots early, strengthening training pipelines and building buffers. IndiGo’s lean, cost-driven model left it uniquely exposed. Was this incompetence or calculated brinkmanship to force regulatory rollback?
Collapse in Plain Sight
Despite every warning sign, IndiGo pressed ahead with an expanded winter schedule under the new DGCA FDTL rules without adequate pilots. It was the aviation equivalent of sailing the Titanic straight into an iceberg. Once an airline that prided itself on a near-90 per cent on-time performance, it collapsed to nearly 20 per cent and deteriorating by the day. Regulatory oversight appeared either ineffective or complicit. Requests for comment from the DGCA went unanswered at the time of publication.
ALPA President Captain Sam Thomas termed the crisis, “a manifestation of IndiGo’s prolonged disregard for authority,” alleging it was an artificially created breakdown to pressure regulators into rolling back fatigue rules, an effort that appeared to succeed. The crisis exposed the dangers of India’s aviation duopoly and long-standing concerns over slot concentration and regulatory favouritism. Captain C S Randhawa, the President of the Federation of Indian Pilots (FIP) publicly stated, “this is a complete violation of the court orders and it has been deliberate by Indigo. Indigo has committed criminal acts and there must a criminal case filed against them.
Passengers Left Behind
The current Indigo crisis is the worst in recent Indian aviation history and something that has not occurred since the Gulf War impacted aviation over the Middle East that had catastrophic financial results. IndiGo issued multiple apologies, including a video message from CEO Pieter Elbers and a later statement from the Chairman.
Amid the chaos, passengers were forgotten. Thousands were stranded during peak season – children seated on the ground, elderly passengers slumped over trolleys, even weddings conducted over video calls. Meanwhile, unchecked fare gouging by other airlines went largely unaddressed, with the Ministry and DGCA intervening only belatedly through price caps.
The episode exposes India’s weak passenger protection framework, starkly inferior to European norms. The current passenger charter offers little real safeguard. This crisis underscores the urgent need for stronger, enforceable passenger rights—and collective pressure to ensure accountability and dignity for flyers. n
The author is an aviation expert, Lawyer & CEO of Avialaz consultants.