With over rs 2600 crore in financial discrepancies, a net quarterly loss of Rs 2329 crore, and a high-profile leadership exodus, the controversy has cast a long shadow over the bank’s reputation and the robustness of corporate governance in Indian financial institutions.
HOW IT ALL UNFOLDED
The first red flag emerged in March 2025, when IndusInd disclosed a staggering Rs 1960 crore mis-valuation in its derivatives portfolio. Some of these traced back all the way to FY16. Then, on May 22, things got worse. A forensic audit revealed that Rs 172.58 crore had been incorrectly recorded as fee income over three quarters in FY25, while Rs 673.82 crore of interest income was also misclassified. Together, these discoveries highlighted the major accounting inconsistencies, possibly deliberate that had gone undetected for years.
And this wasn’t even the first time IndusInd had found itself in such a spot. Back in 2021, its subsidiary Bharat Financial Inclusion Ltd. (BFIL) was accused of evergreening loans. It disbursed over 84,000 microfinance loans without customer consent, conveniently brushed off as a “technical glitch.” While that incident didn’t spiral into a full-blown crisis, it hinted internal control issues.
THE FALLOUT WAS SWIFT
In April 2025, CEO Sumant Kathpalia and Deputy CEO Arun Khurana resigned, taking moral responsibility for the discrepancies. Chief Financial Officer Gobind Jain also stepped down. To plug the leadership vacuum, an executive committee was formed to run daily operations, while Grant Thornton and PwC were roped in for a deeper audit. But the damage was already done.
The bank reported a net loss of Rs 2329 crore in Q4 FY25, its first in 18 years. Gross NPAs jumped to 3.13 per cent, with Rs 1800 crore linked to misclassified microfinance loans. A 27 per cent single-day stock crash in March wiped out Rs 19,000 crore in market value. Shares, which were trading at Rs 1576.35 in June 2024, plunged to Rs 771.10 by May 2025, a whopping 58 per cent decline! The bank also witnessed a 6 per cent drop in advances and a 5 per cent fall in low-cost CASA deposits, sparking fears of depositor flight.
WHAT WENT WRONG INTERNALLY?
At the heart of the crisis is a layered failure of governance and operations. The bank heavily used internal derivative trades to hedge forex risks but mismatched accrual and mark-to-market accounting, inflating earnings and violating RBI’s 2023 guidelines. Misclassified income in the microfinance portfolio further suggests possible executive overrides of internal systems. Oversight too was weak. Neither the board, led by Chairman Sunil Mehta, nor the audit committee, chaired by Bhavna Doshi, flagged the Rs 1960 crore mis-valuation, dating back to FY16. A whistleblower eventually brought it to light. Leadership ethics also came under scrutiny as top executives allegedly bypassed controls, reinforcing a trust deficit. Outdated fraud detection systems failed to catch Rs 172.58 crore in fee manipulation until May 2025, raising concerns over the bank’s real-time monitoring. Finally, routine regulatory and audit reviews missed red flags, prompting parallels with the Satyam case and possibly inviting NFRA scrutiny into auditor lapses and compliance violations.
SO IS THIS FRAUD?
That’s the big question everyone is asking. While IndusInd has consistently referred to the issue as a “discrepancy” in its communications with stock exchanges and credit rating agencies, that narrative may no longer suffice. Statutory auditors are reportedly pushing the board to clarify whether the Rs 2000 crore derivative issue is an error, a discrepancy, or outright fraud.
If it is classified as fraud, as per Section 143 of the Companies Act, 2013, auditors would be obligated to report it to the Ministry of Corporate Affairs, especially given the amount involved. It would also trigger mandatory reporting to the RBI under the Fraud Monitoring Return framework. This would have serious implications for the bank’s reputation, regulatory standing and investor trust.
WHAT HAPPENS NOW?
Despite the chaos, IndusInd’s fundamentals remain reasonably sound. The bank has a healthy liquidity coverage ratio (113 per cent) and capital adequacy ratio (16.46 per cent). Deposits up to Rs 5 lakh remain insured, providing some assurance to retail customers. That said, the path to redemption won’t be easy. The bank must now restore credibility, rebuild leadership, upgrade fraud detection systems and most importantly, be transparent with investors and regulators alike.
The Reserve Bank of India recently reported a staggering 194 per cent surge in bank frauds, with amounts soaring to Rs 36,014 crore in FY25 from Rs 12,230 crore the previous year. While part of this spike stems from changes in classification norms and delayed reporting, it underlines a deeper rot: systemic vulnerabilities and wilful lapses. The RBI’s proposed cash flow-based liquidity stress tests are a step in the right direction, aiming to ensure that banks withstand extreme scenarios. But the bigger question looms, why do these cracks keep showing despite multiple layers of checks and regulations?
