The US imported USD 12.5 billion of pharma from India in 2024, and smartphone imports are rapidly growing too with Apple’s ramp up of iPhone production in India. Smartphone imports have already exceeded USD 11 billion in the first half of 2025. Total imports from India were USD 87 billion, and even after removing pharma and smartphones, there is still a considerable exposure of USD 55 billion. The exposed base is primarily jewellery, textiles and other consumer goods.
In the recent China episode, symmetric tariffs, export controls, and the Boeing delivery ban gave Beijing leverage, pushing the Trump administration back to the negotiating table. The standoff even captured US popular imagination as a new Cold War moment. By contrast, India lacks similar levers and has avoided open retaliation.
Since India is unlikely to yield on Russian oil imports, any trade thaw with Washington will hinge on long-standing US demands: greater market access in agriculture, medical devices, autos, and industrial goods. Agriculture remains a politically sensitive topic and it is unlikely that India can be swayed there, but the rest of them seem to be open bargaining chips that must be resolved before tariff sanity can be restored.
Images of Modi, Xi, and Putin at the SCO summit fuel talk of India drifting from the US. In reality, India and China remain rivals, divided by border conflicts and Beijing’s support for Pakistan. BRICS talk of dethroning the dollar is premature, with the USD still in 88 per cent of forex trades. India’s rupee settlements with Russia face the problem of “stuck rupees,” prompting recycling via government securities. Tariffs are a temporary irritant; bipartisan India-US ties remain vital. This is messy multialignment, not realignment.
